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.What makesthis whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm passion may easily bechang'd into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of thecircumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of forcefrom any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination.Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call'd,diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from eachother, but also from themselves in different times.Philosophy can onlyaccount for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; butmust leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent onprinciples too fine and minute for her comprehension.SECT.IX Of the direct passions'Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, arefounded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affectionof any kind, `tis only requisite to present some good or evil.Upon theremoval of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of loveand hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and of most of ourreflective or secondary impressions.The impressions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, andwith the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion,grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition.The mind by an originalinstinct tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' theybe conceiv'd merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any futureperiod of time.But supposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure,and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the propensity or aversion, with the consequent emotions,but by concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind,excites the new impressions of pride or humility, love or hatred.Thatpropensity, which unites us to the object, or separates us from it, stillcontinues to operate, but in conjunction with the indirect passions,which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas.These indirect passions, being always agreeable or uneasy, give in theirturn additional force to the direct passions, and encrease our desire andaversion to the object.Thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure fromtheir beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or theimpressions of volition and desire.Again, when these cloaths areconsider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us thesentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure, whichattends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and gives newforce to our desire or volition, joy or hope.When good is certain or probable, it produces joy.When evil is in thesame situation there arises GRIEF or SORROW.When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE,according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other.DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply, and AVERSION is deriv'dfrom evil.The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence ofthe evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body.Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the directpassions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which isperfectly unaccountable.Of this kind is the desire of punishment to ourenemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few otherbodily appetites.These passions, properly speaking, produce good andevil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention,except hope and fear, which we shall here endeavour to account for.`Tisevident that the very same event, which by its certainty wou'd producegrief or joy, gives always rise to fear or hope, when only probable anduncertain.In order, therefore, to understand the reason why thiscircumstance makes such a considerable difference, we must reflect on what I have already advanc'd in the preceding book concerning thenature of probability.Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, bywhich the mind is not allow'd to fix on either side, but is incessantly tostfrom one to another, and at one moment is determin'd to consider anobject as existent, and at another moment as the contrary.Theimagination or understanding, call it which you please, fluctuates betwixtthe opposite views; and tho' perhaps it may be oftener turn'd to the oneside than the other, `tis impossible for it, by reason of the opposition ofcauses or chances, to rest on either.The pro and con of the questionalternately prevail; and the mind, surveying the object in its oppositeprinciples, finds such a contrariety as utterly destroys all certainty andestablish'd opinion.Suppose, then, that the object, concerning whose reality we are doubtful,is an object either of desire or aversion, `tis evident, that, according as themind turns itself either to the one side or the other, it must feel amomentary impression of joy or sorrow.An object, whose existence wedesire, gives satisfaction, when we reflect on those causes, which produceit; and for the same reason excites grief or uneasiness from the oppositeconsideration: So that as the understanding, in all probable questions, isdivided betwixt the contrary points of view, the affections must in thesame manner be divided betwixt opposite emotions
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