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.In explaining this distinction, we noted that a referential concept, asa basic thesis of our theory, is never part of what informs a speech or mental actwith a predicable nature, but functions only as what informs such an act witha referential nature, i.e., as what accounts for the intentionality or aboutness ofthat act.Every basic assertion as expressed by a noun phrase and a verb phraseis the result, in other words, of applying just one referential concept and onepredicable concept.What this means is that a complex predicate expression that contains aquantifier phrase cannot be applied in such a way as to presuppose an activeexercise of the referential concept that that quantifier phrase stands for.Thereferential concept that the quantifier phrase stands for has been deactivated , 202 CHAPTER 9.ON GEACH AGAINST GENERAL REFERENCEin other words, which means that the predicable concept expressed by the com-plex predicate that contains that quantifier phrase is formed not on the basis ofthe referential concept that the quantifier phrase stands for but on the basis ofits intensional content instead.Now by the intensional content of a referential concept, as we explained inprevious chapters, we mean the intensional content of the predicable conceptbased on that referential concept.Thus, where A is a proper or common namesymbol, complex or simple, and Q is a quantifier symbol representing a deter-miner of natural language, the predicate expression that is determined by thequantifier phrase (QxA) was defined as follows13:[QxA] =df [»F(QxA)F(x)].This predicate expression can be nominalized, of course, in which case what itdenotes is the intensional content of the predicate, and thereby, indirectly, the in-tensional content of the referential (quantifier) expression (QxA).As explainedin our earlier lecture, we use [QxA] as an abbreviation of [»F(QxA)F(x)].Also,it should be remembered that a referential (quantifier) expression that occurswithin an abstract singular term, i.e., within a nominalized complex predicate,has been deactivated and is not used in that occurrence to represent an activeexercise of the referential concept that the expression otherwise stands for as agrammatical subject.The example we gave was[Sofia]NP [seeks [a unicorn]]VP“! “! “!("xSofia)[»xSeek(x, ["yUnicorn])](x),where the quantifier phrase a unicorn that occurs as part the predicate seeksa unicorn has been deactivated.The same quantifier is also deactivated inSofiaNP [finds [a unicorn]]VP“!“! “!("xSofia)[»xFind(x, ["yUnicorn])](x).But because the predicate Find is extensional in its second argument position,then the latter sentence implies("yUnicorn)("xSofia)Finds(x, y).The predicate Seek, on the other hand, is not extensional in its second argumentposition, which means that Sofia seeks a unicorn does not imply that there is13The application of the »-operator to predicate variables is understood as an abbreviatednotation, which, in the monadic case, is indicated as follows:[»F Õ] =df [»y("F )(y = F '" Õ)],where y does not occur free in Õ. 9.3.ACTIVE VERSUS DEACTIVATED CONCEPTS 203a unicorn.In other words, even though Sofia seeks a unicorn and Sofia findsa unicorn have the same logical form, nevertheless one implies that there is aunicorn, whereas the other does not.The difference, as we explained in ourprevious chapters, is that the following (instance of a) meaning postulate,[»xFinds(x, ["yA])] = [»x("yA)Finds(x, y)].is assumed for Find, whereas no such similar meaning postulate can be assumedfor Seek.This type of meaning postulate also applies to our use of the copula toexpress identity, as when we say that Sofia is an actress.Note that the predicableconcept expressed by is an actress in this example cannot be represented by[»x("yActress)(x = y)],because the quantifier phrase ("yActress) has not been deactivated.That is,this »-abstract is not the appropriate way to express the cognitive structure ofthe speech act in question.What we need here is a symbolic counterpart ofthe copula, e.g., Is, as a two-place predicate constant.Thus, the appropriateanalysis of the speech act in question is:[Sofia]NP [is an actress]VP("xSofia) [»xIs(x, ["yActress])]("xSofia)[»xIs(x, ["yActress])](x),where the quantifier phrase ("yActress) has been deactivated.Now of course this does not mean that we are asserting that Sofia is identicalwith the intensional content of being an actress, just as in asserting that Sofiaseeks a unicorn we do not mean that Sofia seeks the intensional content of beinga unicorn.To get at the right truth conditions for this sort of assertion, we needto assume the following as a meaning postulate for the copula Is:[»xIs(x, ["yA])] = [»x("yA)(x = y)],where A is a variable having complex or simple names, proper or common, assubstituends.Thus, because of this meaning postulate, the following("xSofia)[»xIs(x, ["yActress])](x) ”! ("xSofia)("yActress)(x = y)is valid in the logic of conceptual realism.1414Russell, incidentally, proposed a similar analysis in his 1903 Principles, where he assumedthat every proposition consists of a relation between terms , and that, e.g., the propositionexpressed by Socrates is a man expresses a relation between Socrates and the denotingconcept a man.Presumably, the relation was not strict identity, but something like what weare representing here by Is.Of course, Russell was proposing a logical realist theory and not aconceptualist theory; and he had nothing like our distinction between active and deactivatedconcepts. 204 CHAPTER 9.ON GEACH AGAINST GENERAL REFERENCE9.4 Deactivation and Geach s ArgumentsIn one of his arguments against general reference, Geach claims that we cannotsuppose some man to refer to some man in one single way, because, if it werea genuine referring expression, then we should have to distinguish severaltypes of reference it is not easy to see how many
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